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The Independent Counsel Statute:
A Premature Demise
Julian A. Cook, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
I think a lot of people are questioning the concept of whether
or not . . . we can set up someone who really is totally independent. There’s really nobody who has total independence in
our system of government, and if they had total independence, they would probably be dangerous, so we’re struggling
now to see whether or not, putting this statute aside in all
probability, there is a way that we can achieve a certain
measure of independence, but more accountability. That’s
what’s been lacking over the last 20 years.—Senator Fred
Thompson1

With the backdrop of the impeachment trial of President
William Jefferson Clinton,2 Congress was confronted with the
quandary of whether to reauthorize the independent counsel
statute. As the statute approached its June 30, 1999 lapse date,
lawmakers grappled with and bandied about an array of proposals, including statutory abandonment,3 in the midst of tre* Julian A. Cook, III, Assistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of
Law, Texas Southern University. A.B. Duke University (1983), M.P.A. Columbia University (1985), J.D. University of Virginia (1988). I am very grateful to Professor Earl
C. Dudley, who reviewed an earlier draft of this article and provided helpful suggestions. I also thank Irrekka Clark for her research assistance. Finally, I thank my wife,
Robin, for editing this article. The opinions expressed are those of the author.
1. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1999) (responding to question posed by Tim Russert with respect to the possibility that the independent counsel
statute would be reauthorized).
2. See ‘This Must Be a Time of . . . Renewal,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at A33
(noting that on February 12, 1999, President Clinton was acquitted in his impeachment trial); David Broder, Don’t Rewrite Independent-Counsel Statute, DENVER POST,
Mar. 3, 1999, at B09; John Whitesides, Reno: Dump Independent Counsel Law,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 1999, at A12.
3. See Jerry Seper, Counsel Statute Hearings on Tap Starr, Judges Who Chose
Him to Testify, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at A4; John Hanchette, Law Expiring That
Allowed Counsel, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 30, 1999, at A03. For additional discus-
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mendous political tension and public fervor over the actions of
the President, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, and members of Congress.4 Ultimately, Congress allowed the statute to
expire, leaving the prosecution of high-ranking Executive
Branch officials in the hands of the Department of Justice.5
Advocates of reauthorization could only hope that the issue of
reauthorization would be revisited at a later time.6
As noted by Senator Thompson, a persistent shortcoming
associated with the statute “over the last 20 years” had been
the failure to effect a statutory balance which preserved prosecutorial independence and latitude, yet provided sufficient
safeguards against the runaway exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, this objective underlied the statute’s enactment. With Watergate serving as the precipitous event, and after five years of legislative effort, the original version of the
statute emerged in 1978.7 Perceived as a mechanism that
would bolster public confidence with respect to the prosecution
of high-ranking members of the Executive Branch, the statute
removed the prosecutive function from the Justice Department
and placed it in the hands of a judicially appointed independent
counsel.8 However, despite repeated attempts at modification,
many believed that the want of adequate safeguards with respect to independent counsel activity, inter alia, ultimately undercut the very purpose of the legislation.9
In this article, I dispute the contention that the statute’s
arguable failures with respect to independent counsel accountability mandate statutory abandonment. By allowing the statute to lapse, Congress has necessarily subjected the public to
the observance of a prosecutorial process strewn with conflicts
of interest, as well as individual defendants to investigations

sion of the proposals for statutory reform and the call for statutory abandonment, see
infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
4. See Eileen McNamara, Local Politics, Local Cares, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14,
1999, at B1; Katy Harriger, Fuming Over a Flawed Statute, Congress Decides Whether
to Fix or Finish Off the Independent Counsel, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCE, Nov. 1,
1998, at E1.
5. See Independent Counsels Needed: Abuses Shouldn’t Overshadow the Law’s
Benefits, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., June 30, 1999, at 10A.
6. See John Hanchette, Independent-Counsel Concept May Not Be Dead, DES
MOINES REG., June 30, 1999, at 5.
7. See Harriger, supra note 4, at E1.
8. See id.
9. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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and prosecutions pursued by interested prosecutors. Instead,
through statutory modification, the coveted balance between
independent counsel liberty and accountability can be effectively achieved.
I will demonstrate how, through a proposal I initially presented in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, this
balance can be achieved and the statute salvaged.10 To this end,
I commence with a historical retracing of the statute, from its
inception in 1978 through its last reauthorization in 1994.
Thereafter, I will discuss and critique the leading argument
presented in opposition to statutory renewal during the congressional reauthorization hearings in 1999. Finally, I will reintroduce my proposal for statutory reform and proceed to critique it in light of Morrison v. Olson,11 the United States
Supreme Court case which upheld the statute’s constitutionality. Through a detailed dissection of the opinion, I will demonstrate not only the proposal’s constitutionality, but also how
the proposal effectively regulates independent counsel activity,
preserves independent counsel liberty, and ensures appearances of propriety.
II. HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
A. 1978 Special Prosecutor Law
Enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,12
the original special prosecutor law13 subjected the following Executive Branch officials to its jurisdiction: the President; Vice
President; officials listed in § 5312 of title 5;14 individuals employed in the Executive Office of the President or the Department of Justice who were compensated at certain minimum

10. See Julian A. Cook, III, Mend It or End It? What to Do with the Independent
Counsel Statute, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 320-37 (1998).
11. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
12. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1978) (setting five-year sunset provision for statute).
14. The following officials listed in § 5312 were thus subject to the special prosecutor law: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney
General, Secretary of Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of Education. See 5 U.S.C. § 5312
(1976) (amended 1977).
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levels; any Assistant Attorney General; the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; the Internal Revenue Service Commissioner; any of the aforementioned individuals who
held such positions “during the incumbency of the President or
during the period the last preceding President held office, if
such President was of the same political party as the incumbent President”; and officers of the President’s principal national election or reelection campaign committee.15
However, as a prerequisite to prosecution, a procedural
mechanism involving the Attorney General and a panel of
judges had to be followed. If the Attorney General received specific information indicating that an official delineated in subsection (b) had “committed a violation of any Federal criminal
law” (excluding petty offenses), she was required to conduct a
preliminary investigation.16 If, at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, she determined “that the matter [was] so
unsubstantiated that no further investigation or prosecution”
was necessary, the Attorney General was required to inform
the “division of the court”17 of her decision.18 This decision was
15. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1978) expressly provided:
(b) The persons referred to in subsection (a) of this section are—
(1) the President and Vice President;
(2) any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312 of title 5;
(3) any individual working in the Executive Office of the President and compensated at a rate not less than the annual rate of basic pay provided for level IV
of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5;
(4) any individual working in the Department of Justice and compensated at
a rate not less than the annual rate of basic pay provided for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, any Assistant Attorney General, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
(5) any individual who held any office or position described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4) of this subsection during the incumbency of the President or
during the period the last preceding President held office, if such preceding President was of the same political party as the incumbent President; and
(6) any officer of the principal national campaign committee seeking the election or reelection of the President.

Id.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) provided:
The Attorney General shall conduct an investigation pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter whenever the Attorney General receives specific information that any
of the persons described in subsection (b) of this section has committed a violation
of any Federal criminal law other than a violation constituting a petty offense.

Id. § 591(a). The preliminary investigation could not exceed ninety days. See id. §
592(b).
17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1). The division of the court was not empowered to appoint
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not subject to judicial review.19 In the event, however, the Attorney General believed that further investigation or prosecution was warranted, she was required to request the appointment by the division of the court of a special prosecutor.20 In
making the application, it was incumbent upon the Attorney
General to include sufficient information to enable the court to
adequately define the scope of the special prosecutor’s jurisdiction.21 This jurisdictional grant was not necessarily fixed. It
could be supplemented through the referral of what the statute
termed “a matter that relates” to the earlier grant.22 Either the
Attorney General or the special prosecutor were authorized to
seek the expansion of jurisdiction on this basis.23 In the event a
related matter was referred by the Attorney General, the special prosecutor was required to notify the division of the court.24
Notably, a majority of either the majority or minority party
members of the Committee on the Judiciary of either the House
of Representatives or the Senate could request, in writing, that
the Attorney General seek the appointment of a special prosecutor.25 If such a request was submitted, the Attorney General
had to provide a written response to the requesting congressional committee detailing the actions, if any, undertaken by
the Attorney General in response to the request.26 If an appli-

a special prosecutor in the event the Attorney General declined to seek such appointment. Id.; see also discussion of the division of the court infra notes 19-24, 29-31, 36-37,
40-45, 73-74, and 88 and accompanying text. If, after her formal declination, the Attorney General received additional information sufficient to justify additional investigation or prosecution, the Attorney General was required to seek the appointment by the
court of a special prosecutor within 90 days of the receipt of the information. See 28
U.S.C. § 592(c)(2).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(f).
20. See id. § 592(c)(1). Similarly, the statute mandated that the Attorney General
“apply to the division of the court for the appointment of a special prosecutor” if she
failed to make a determination within the allotted 90 days. Id.
21. See id. § 592(d)(1).
22. See id. § 592(e).
23. See id. (providing that the Attorney General may ask the special prosecutor
to accept the referral of related matters); see also id. § 594(e) (providing that a special
prosecutor may seek the referral of related matters from either the Attorney General or
the division of the court).
24. See id. § 594(e).
25. See id. § 595(e).
26. See id. The Attorney General had to respond no “later than thirty days after
the receipt of such a request, or not later than fifteen days after the completion of a
preliminary investigation of the matter with respect to which the request is made,
whichever is later.” Id.
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cation was not submitted, the Attorney General was required
to explain the inaction.27 Public disclosure of the Attorney General’s written notification was generally prohibited, except to
the extent the committee “on its own initiative or upon the request of the Attorney General” believed that release of portions
of the notification would not adversely impact the rights of any
individual.28
The division of the court, which was part of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, consisted
of three circuit court judges or justices who were appointed by
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and
served two-year terms.29 As has been noted, upon Attorney
General application, the division of the court was required to
appoint a special prosecutor, to define his prosecutorial jurisdiction,30 and, upon request of the Attorney General, to expand
such jurisdiction.31
During his incumbency, the special prosecutor could avail
himself of all the investigative and prosecutorial methods traditionally employed by the Department of Justice, including
utilizing the grand jury, engaging in civil, criminal, and appellate litigation, challenging claims of privilege, and applying for
grants of immunity.32 In carrying out these duties, the special
prosecutor could access Department of Justice resources, including, but not limited to, pertinent records, files, and other
materials, as well as departmental personnel.33 The statute
also attempted to mandate compliance with the policies of the
Justice Department; however, a proviso trailing the mandatory
language arguably undermined this congressional intent. Specifically, compliance with departmental policies was required,
but only “to the extent that such special prosecutor deem[ed]
appropriate.”34
In addition, there was an optional, rather indeterminatelyphrased reporting requirement that left much discretion to the
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id. § 49(a), (d). Senior and retired judges or justices received priority in
selection, and service was restricted to only one judge or justice from a particular court.
See id. § 49(c), (d).
30. See id. § 593(b).
31. See id. § 593(c).
32. See id. § 594(a).
33. See id. § 594(d).
34. Id. § 594(f).
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special prosecutor with respect to the report’s contents. Section
595(a) provided, “A special prosecutor appointed under this
chapter may make public from time to time, and shall send to
the Congress statements or reports on the activities of such special prosecutor. These statements and reports shall contain
such information as such special prosecutor deems appropriate.”35
Further, prior to the cessation of operations, the special
prosecutor was required to submit a final report to the division
of the court, detailing “a description of the work of the special
prosecutor, including the disposition of all cases brought, and
the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such special prosecutor which was not
prosecuted.”36 Discretion was retained by the division of the
court with respect to the public release of the special prosecutor’s reports. Release orders were to give due consideration to
the rights of individuals mentioned in the report as well as any
pending prosecutions.37 The special prosecutor was also required to inform the House of Representatives “of any substantial and credible information which such special prosecutor receives that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.”38
Once appointed, the special prosecutor was largely insulated from removal. Unless impeached or convicted, the special
prosecutor could only be removed by the Attorney General “for
extraordinary impropriety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impair[ed] the
performance of such special prosecutor’s duties.”39 If removed,
the division of the court as well as the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were to be provided with a report prepared
by the Attorney General detailing the facts and reasons underlying the removal.40 Public disclosure of the report by either
congressional committee or the division of the court was permitted so long as neither the rights of individuals named in the
report nor any pending prosecutions were prejudiced.41 A special prosecutor was entitled to contest his removal in a civil ac35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 595(a) (emphasis added).
Id. § 595(b)(2).
See id. § 595(b)(3).
Id. § 595(c).
Id. § 596(a)(1).
See id. § 596(a)(2).
See id.
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tion brought before the division of the court.42
A special prosecutor seeking to conclude his investigation,
could do so upon notifying the Attorney General that all matters within his prosecutorial jurisdiction had “been completed
or so substantially completed that it would [be] appropriate for
the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and
prosecutions,” and by submitting a final report to the division
of the court.43 Alternatively, a special prosecutor’s operations
could be terminated by the body that appointed him—the division of the court. Subsection (b)(2)44 provided, in pertinent part:
The division of the court, either on its own motion or upon
suggestion of the Attorney General, may terminate an office
of special prosecutor at any time, on the ground that the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction
of the special prosecutor or accepted by such special prosecutor under section 594(e) of this title, and any resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed
that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to
complete such investigations and prosecutions.45

B. 1983 Amendments
In 1983, an array of amendments was effected which was
designed to remedy deficiencies that were both structural and
perceptive.46 Present day usage of the term “independent counsel” stemmed from these amendments, which substituted the
term throughout the statute in lieu of “special prosecutor.”47
The change, which was purely symbolic, was intended to remove the “Watergate stigma” that was associated with the
term “special prosecutor.”48
In addition, the 1983 amendments constricted the number
of covered officials. Whereas in 1978 any officer of the principal

42. See id. § 596(a)(3).
43. Id. § 596(b)(1)(A).
44. See id. § 596(b)(2).
45. Id.; see also discussion of Morrison v. Olson regarding the constitutionality of
this provision, as well as its application to a statutory proposal advocated by the author, infra notes 130-48, 229-34 and accompanying text.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1982) (amended 1983) (setting five-year sunset provision).
47. See id. §§ 591-98, § 49.
48. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1992).

COOK-FIN.DOC

1367]

THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE

4/5/00 7:26 AM

1375

national campaign committee was subject to the independent
counsel law, the 1983 amendments confined the statute’s applicability to higher level officials; namely, the chairman and
treasurer of the principal committee, as well as “any officer of
the campaign exercising authority at the national level, such as
the campaign manager or director, during the incumbency of
the President.”49 In a related adjustment,50 the statute was further amended to permit the appointment of an independent
counsel to investigate individuals not delineated in § 591(b).
Section 591(c) now authorized the appointment of an independent counsel whenever the Attorney General or other Department of Justice officer could not properly investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing on account of a personal,
financial, or political conflict of interest.51
Section 592 was also subject to some notable revisions.
First, the discretion of the Attorney General was augmented
with respect to the preliminary investigation. While the Attorney General retained the authority to evaluate the specificity of
a criminal allegation, she was further empowered to assess the
credibility of the source of the information.52 Thus, the Attorney
49. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(8).
50. See id. Section 591(b)(3)-(7) was also amended to read, in pertinent part:
(3) any individual working in the Executive Office of the President who is compensated at or above a rate equivalent to level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5;
(4) any Assistant Attorney General and any individual working in the Department
of Justice compensated at a rate at or above level III of the Executive Schedule
under section 5314 of title 5;
(5) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
(6) any individual who held any office or position described in any of paragraphs
(1) through (5) of this subsection during the period consisting of the incumbency of
the President such individual serves plus one year after such incumbency, but in
no event longer than two years after the individual leaves office;
(7) any individual described in paragraph (6) who continues to hold office for not
more than 90 days into the term of the next President during the period such individual serves plus one year after such individual leaves office.

Id. § 591(b)(3)-(7).
51. See id. § 591(c).
52. See id. § 592(a)(1). Author Terry Eastland noted the reason underlying this
amendment:
The “specific information” standard affected not just the [Hamilton] Jordan case.
In his testimony, Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani characterized as a
“persistent problem” the “deliberate aim of the drafters to remove any assessment
of credibility from the triggering process.” It was the experience of the Department, said Giuliani, that a sufficiently specific allegation could trigger the law
even when it came from a source that was “inherently incredible” and even when
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General was now authorized to decline further investigation on
the basis of a source’s want of credibility.53 On the other hand,
the 1983 amendments definitively restricted the expanse of an
Attorney General’s preliminary investigative authority. Section
592(a)(2) explicitly prohibited the Attorney General from convening grand juries, negotiating plea bargains, granting immunity, or issuing subpoenas.54
The amendments also eased the Attorney General’s capacity to decline the referral of matters for independent counsel
prosecution. There was concern that the original standard,
which sanctioned the failure to appoint an independent counsel
only when a “matter [was] so unsubstantiated that no further
investigation or prosecution [was] warranted,” too easily triggered independent counsel investigations.55 Accordingly, § 592
(b)(1) was changed, permitting declination when the Attorney
General determined “that there [were] no reasonable grounds
to believe that further investigation or prosecution [was] warranted.”56 In making this determination, the Attorney General

the charge itself was “indisputably incredible.”
Congress judged the standard “too low” and decided to raise it by enabling
the Attorney General also to consider the credibility of the accuser. The concern for
fairness was evident.

TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS, AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 71 (1989).
53. Subsection (f) was added to § 593, permitting the division of the court to extend up to 60 days the period to conduct a preliminary investigation, upon a showing of
good cause by the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f).
54. See id. § 592(a)(2).
55. Eastland made these observations in regard to this amendment:
While the Jordan case exposed a problem faced by the Attorney General in
evaluating whether a preliminary investigation should even be opened, the Jordan
and [Timothy] Kraft cases both illustrated a difficulty the Attorney General had in
making the later decision of whether to apply for a special prosecutor. In those
cases the Attorney General was forced to seek a special prosecutor because, as required by Title VI, he was unable to tell the court, at the close of the respective
preliminary investigations, that “the matter is so unsubstantiated that no further
investigation or prosecution is warranted.” This standard prevented the Attorney
General from exercising the kind of routine discretion available to all other prosecutors.
. . . Former Special Prosecutor Arthur Christy, who handled the Jordan case,
told the Senate that the standard for referral was “too quick a trigger”. . . . So it
was that a second standard stated in Title VI was deemed too low. And unfair.

EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 72-73.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1). See also the changes to § 592(c)(1) (substituting “finds
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted,”
in lieu of “that the matter is so unsubstantiated as not to warrant further investigation
or prosecution”) and the changes to § 592(c)(2) (substituting “reasonable grounds exist
to warrant” in lieu of “such information warrants”).
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was required to comply with policies promulgated by “the Department of Justice with respect to the enforcement of criminal
laws.”57
The congressional will to better integrate independent
counsel activity with departmental policies was evidenced in an
array of revisions to § 594. An independent counsel was now
permitted “to dismiss matters within his prosecutorial jurisdiction without conducting an investigation or at any subsequent
time prior to prosecution if to do so would be consistent with the
written or other established policies of the Department of Justice.”58 Similarly, subsection (f) was amended to require independent counsel compliance with Department of Justice policies “except where not possible,”59 in lieu of the previous, more
lenient requirement, “to the extent that such special prosecutor
deems appropriate.”60
Finally, language was appended to § 594(a) permitting an
independent counsel to “consult[] with the United States Attorney for the district in which the violation was alleged to have
occurred.”61 As observed by Terry Eastland, the objective underlying the attempted integration was an overriding congressional concern for prosecutorial fairness:
Congress also tried to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of special prosecutor adherence to Department policies
generally. . . . The legislative history indicates that the burden of explaining any departure from Department policies
should be placed on the special prosecutor. “If he does deviate
from established practices of the Department, the special
prosecutor should thoroughly explain his reasons for doing so
in his report to the court at the conclusion of his investigation.” . . . Both of these amendments [to 28 U.S.C. §§ 594 (a)
and (f)] contemplated that a special prosecutor would be less
likely to act unfairly toward the subject of his investigation
the more integrated he was with the institutional thinking of
the Justice Department. Even so, the legislative history indicated that Congress rejected the notion that failure of a special prosecutor to follow Justice Department policies constituted grounds for removal. As amended, the statute provided

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. § 592(c)(1).
Id. § 594(g) (emphasis added).
Id. § 594(f) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1978).
28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(10) (1983) (emphasis added).
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no sanction for an unjustified departure from Department policy.62

An attorneys’ fees provision, albeit limited, was added as
well. The provision applied only to the subject of the investigation and permitted the awarding of attorneys’ fees upon satisfaction of two requirements: first, that the subject was not indicted; and second, that, but for the independent counsel
investigation, the fees would not have been incurred.63 Finally,
changes to § 596 marginally liberalized the ability of an Attorney General to remove an independent counsel. The new
amendments empowered the removal of an independent counsel for “good cause” in lieu of the previous, higher standard of
“extraordinary impropriety.”64
C. 1987 Amendments
Like the amendments in 1983, the 1987 amendments contained many substantive revisions. Unlike the 1983 amendments, however, the Reauthorization Act of 1987 was notable
for its sheer multitude of statutory modifications.65
Under the original enactment, the Attorney General was
required to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of
specific information indicating a violation of federal criminal
law by a covered official.66 Thus, any preliminary investigation
62. EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 73-74.
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(g)(1)-(2).
64. Id. § 596(a)(1). Eastland explained the congressional motivation underlying
the amendment:
This amendment represented a bit of constitutional housekeeping. The removal
standard of “extraordinary impropriety” applied to no other officials, not even the
heads of independent agencies, who could be dismissed for “good cause.” It was an
indefinable standard, yet presumably it tied the Attorney General’s hands more
tightly than “good cause.” And it produced this irony: heads of independent agencies performed duties that were in theory less executive than those performed by a
special prosecutor, yet they could be more easily removed. Of course, Congress did
not want special prosecutors removed once appointed; the legislative history indicated, in fact, that in the view of Congress the failure to obey a presidential order
would not constitute a “good cause” for dismissal. But this understanding did not
diminish Congress’ desire to reduce the statute’s potential constitutional vulnerability. By applying to special prosecutors the same removal standard as applied to
heads of independent agencies, Congress was hoping to insulate Title VI from constitutional challenge and to provide the Attorney General and the courts a developed body of law by which to understand “good cause.”

EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 67.
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1987) (setting five-year sunset provision).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1978). See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Sec-
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was necessarily dependent upon an initial finding by the Attorney General that the information received was sufficiently
specific. In 1987, an amendment was added that circumscribed
the scope of this initial inquiry. Specifically, § 591(d)(1) limited
the Attorney General’s consideration to two criteria: first “the
specificity of the information received; and [second] the credibility of the source(s) of information.”67 No other issues, including the intent of the accused, could be considered.68 Moreover,
another amendment required the Attorney General to complete
this inquiry within fifteen days after initial receipt of the information. If, after this time period, the Attorney General determined that the information was specific and from a credible
source, or the Attorney General was unable to make a determination within the allotted time, a preliminary investigation
would commence.69 On the other hand, a preliminary investigation was not required if the Attorney General determined that
the information was either nonspecific or from a noncredible
source.70
A concomitant measure imposed a considerable restriction
upon an Attorney General’s consideration of an accused’s mental state during the preliminary investigative phase. Under the
new amendment, an Attorney General could decline a matter
for independent counsel referral on this basis only if “there
tion 591(a) was amended in 1987 to read as follows:
The Attorney General shall conduct a preliminary investigation in accordance with
section 592 whenever the Attorney General receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person described in subsection (b) may
have violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class
B or C misdemeanor or an infraction.

28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1987). Whereas § 591(b) carefully delineated the individuals subject
to the Act, § 591(c), enacted in 1987, expanded this list somewhat indefinitely. Subsection (c) authorized the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation with
respect to individuals not delineated in subsection (b) whenever she received sufficient
information indicating a violation of federal law, and an investigation by the Attorney
General (or other designated Department of Justice official) posed a “personal, financial, or political conflict of interest.” Id. § 591(c). Section 591(e) was also enacted which
required Attorney General recusal from an investigation whenever “information received under this chapter involves the Attorney General or a person with whom the
Attorney General has a current or recent personal or financial relationship”; in such
instances, “the next most senior officer in the Department of Justice” (assuming the
nonexistence of a disqualifying conflict) shall be appointed to conduct the investigation.
Id. § 591(e).
67. Id. § 591(d)(1).
68. See id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i); see also EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 85.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(2).
70. See id.
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[was] clear and convincing evidence that the person lacked
such state of mind.”71 Furthermore, § 592(a)(1), as amended,
contained an additional proviso that restricted to ninety days a
preliminary investigation conducted pursuant to a congressional request.72
There were also several amendments that addressed congressional concerns pertaining to independent counsel jurisdiction. An amendment to § 593(b), for example, was enacted to
address prosecutorial inefficiency attributable to jurisdictional
limitations on independent counsel investigative activity.73
Specifically, subsection (b)(3) directed the division of the court,
when defining prosecutorial jurisdiction, to
assure that the independent counsel has adequate authority
to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter with respect to which the Attorney General has requested the appointment of the independent counsel, and all matters related
to that subject matter. Such jurisdiction shall also include the
authority to investigate and prosecute Federal crimes, other
than those classified as Class B or C misdemeanors or infractions, that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of
the matter with respect to which the Attorney General’s request was made, including perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.74

Thus, in its initial grant of jurisdiction, the division of the court
was directed to permit an independent counsel to investigate
and prosecute those matters deemed “related” to the subject
matter preliminarily investigated by the Attorney General.
Therefore, an independent counsel was now empowered to investigate and prosecute certain matters without obtaining prior
approval from the Attorney General. Related matters could in-

71. Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 592(c)(1) was also amended to read: “In determining under this chapter whether reasonable grounds exist to warrant further investigation, the Attorney General shall comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice with respect to the conduct of criminal
investigations.” Id. § 592(c)(1) (emphasis added). See supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1). In contrast to information received from noncongressional sources, the Attorney General was required to conduct her initial inquiry
and her preliminary investigation within 90 days. See id; see also supra notes 16-19
and accompanying text; EASTLAND, supra note 52, at 85.
73. See discussion of this provision in the context of Morrison v. Olson infra notes
130-48 and accompanying text.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3).
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clude, but were not restricted to, perjury, obstruction of justice,
destruction of evidence, and witness intimidation, among other
federal criminal offenses.
Whereas § 593(b) concerned “related matter” jurisdiction,
another section, 593(c)(2), was added to address jurisdictional
issues deemed unrelated to the original grant. Anticipating the
situation where an independent counsel uncovered alleged
criminal activity extraneous to the original jurisdictional mandate, subsection (c)(2) authorized the independent counsel to
present such information to the Attorney General for conducting a preliminary investigation.75 Though otherwise governed
by § 592, the Attorney General, in such instances, was required
to complete the investigation within thirty days of receipt of
the information and to give “great weight to any recommendations of the independent counsel.”76
Finally, an array of miscellaneous amendments were also
enacted that addressed, inter alia, Attorney General and independent counsel conduct, as well as the responsibilities owed to
and by the division of the court and Congress.77

75. See id. § 593(c)(2).
76. Id. § 593(c)(2)(A).
77. See EASTLAND, supra note 52 at 86-87 (summarizing the respective amendments). The following amendments represent a nonexhaustive listing of the remaining
amendments enacted in 1987: § 592(a)(1) (requiring Attorney General to “promptly notify the division of the court . . . of the commencement of [a] preliminary investigation
and the date of such commencement”); § 592(g)(3) (requiring Attorney General to provide the congressional committee who requested an independent counsel investigation
with any documentation that the independent counsel filed with the division of the
court; further requiring Attorney General, if an independent counsel appointment is
not sought, to provide a report to the congressional committee detailing the reasons
underlying the declination); § 592(g)(4) (authorizing congressional committee to release
for public consumption documents “as will not in the committee’s judgment prejudice
the rights of any individual”); § 593(d) (authorizing the division of the court to request
of the Attorney General “further explanation of the reasons” underlying her refusal,
after a preliminary investigation, to seek the appointment of an independent counsel);
§ 593(b)(2) (providing that the division of the court shall appoint as independent counsels individuals with “appropriate experience . . . who” will conduct an efficient and
prompt investigation); § 594(h)(1) (requiring independent counsel to file periodic expense reports and a final report detailing the investigative and prosecutorial work of
independent counsel’s office); § 594(h)(2) (authorizing the division of the court to publicly release such reports “as are appropriate to protect the rights of any individual
named in such report and to prevent undue interference with any pending prosecution”); § 596(c) (requiring periodic Comptroller General audits of independent counsel
expenditures and submission of a report to Congress upon conclusion of the independent counsel’s investigation).
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D. 1994 Amendments
Though numerous, the amendments enacted in 1994 were
comparatively less substantive than in years past. Nonetheless,
the 1994 amendments were notable in certain respects.78
For example, members of Congress were explicitly added to
the list of covered persons.79 Though theoretically encompassed
within the statute in 1987, the 1994 amendments sought to allay suggestions to the contrary by categorically subjecting
members of Congress to independent counsel prosecution.80 In
addition, the period of time within which the Attorney General
was required to determine whether a preliminary hearing was
warranted was increased from fifteen to thirty days.81
The statute, as originally enacted, mandated Department of
Justice assistance when requested by an independent counsel.
In an attempt to characterize the contemplated assistance, the
statute rather generally stated that the Department should
provide, inter alia, the “personnel necessary to perform such
independent counsel’s duties.”82 The 1994 amendments expounded upon this personnel issue by detailing, with somewhat
greater precision, the type of assistance contemplated. Section
594(d)(1) was amended by additionally providing that, upon independent counsel request, “prosecutors, administrative personnel and other employees of the Department of Justice” shall
be detailed to the office of independent counsel.83
Congress, yet again, tinkered with the language of § 594(f).
Specifically, Congress deleted the quoted language which provided that an independent counsel “shall, except where not
possible, comply” with departmental policies. The newest
amendment now mandated compliance “except to the extent
that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter.”84 Appended thereto was the following additional sentence: “To determine these policies and policies under subsection (l)(1)(B), the independent counsel shall, except to the extent that doing so would be inconsistent with the purposes of
78.
1999).
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (setting five-year sunset provision until June 30,
See id. § 591(c)(2).
See 28 U.S.C. § 591(c) (1987).
See 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(2) (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 594(d) (1978).
28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(1) (1994).
Id. § 594(f)(1). See also supra notes 34 and 59 and accompanying text.
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this chapter, consult with the Department of Justice.”85
There were also a number of revisions pertinent to independent counsel expenditures. The amendments, though indefinite and subjectively phrased, directed the independent
counsel to “(i) conduct all activities with due regard for expense; (ii) authorize only reasonable and lawful expenditures;
and (iii) promptly, upon taking office, assign to a specific employee the duty of certifying that expenditures of the independent counsel are reasonable.”86
Moreover, the independent counsel was required to follow
Department of Justice policies with respect to expenditures,
unless compliance was “inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter.”87 Finally, the division of the court’s authority to terminate the operations of an independent counsel was appended
with certain periodic review requirements. Specifically, the division of the court was instructed to “determine on its own motion whether termination is appropriate under this paragraph
no later than 2 years after the appointment of an independent
counsel, at the end of the succeeding 2-year period, and thereafter at the end of each succeeding 1-year period.”88

85. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1).
86. Id. § 594(l)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
87. Id. § 594(l)(1)(C). In addition, there were several other revisions pertinent to
independent counsel expenditures. See id. § 594(l)(2) (requiring the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States courts to “provide administrative support and
guidance” to an independent counsel); id. § 594(l)(3) (directing Administrator of General Services to provide office space—presumptively within a federal building—to independent counsels); id. § 594(b)(2) (permitting payment of travel-related expenses incurred by independent counsel); id. § 594(b)(3)(A) (prohibiting payment of travel
related expenses to independent counsel employees after one year of service “for the
purpose of commuting to or from the city in which the primary office of the independent
counsel or person is located); id. § 595(a)(2) (This section was amended to require independent counsels to annually report to Congress regarding independent counsel activities, “including a description of the progress of any investigation or prosecution conducted by the independent counsel.” Though the report could omit confidential
information, the independent counsel was required to provide information “adequate to
justify the expenditures that the office of the independent counsel has made.”); id. §
596(c) (amending section to further require an independent counsel to submit twice
annually a statement of expenditures, and the Comptroller General to conduct a financial review of the statements and to submit the results to Congress).
88. Id. § 596(b)(2). For a discussion of litigation challenging the constitutionality
of this provision, see infra note 234.
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III. 1999 LAPSING OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
A. Arguments Against Renewal
The high drama and tensions associated with Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Bill Clinton, and the subsequent impeachment hearings, left Congress
in a quagmire with respect to the future of the independent
counsel law.89 While some expressed support for renewal with
substantive modifications,90 others expressed deep reservations
about the law, preferring to return the investigative function to
the Attorney General.91

89. The statute expired on June 30, 1999. See Independent Counsels Needed;
Abuses Shouldn’t Overshadow the Law’s Benefits, supra note 5; United States Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act,
FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (statement of Senator Robert G. Torricelli)
[hereinafter Torricelli Testimony], in which Senator Torricelli addressed Kenneth Starr
by stating:
You will forgive me, but I do not understand how a learned man of good judgment
allowed things to get to this state of affairs. It is true that you were under a merciless attack. But it was not necessary to pin a target to your chest on all occasions
either. And to be fair, you were a contributor to some of your own public demise in
the eyes of the American people . . . . I believe there is virtually no chance the independent counsel statute will be reenacted, and indeed I believe in this last final
chapter of this sorry episode you have done a service to the nation by participating
in its demise.

Id.
90. See United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing
on the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony
of Senator Lieberman) [hereinafter Lieberman Testimony]; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act, FED.
DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony of Senator Collins); Statement of
Lawrence E. Walsh Before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Hearing on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE,
Mar. 24, 1999; Statement of Professor Ken Gormley Before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs on the Reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act, FED.
DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 24, 1999; Statement of Samuel Dash Before the Committee
on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Concerning the Reauthorization of the
Independent Counsel Statute, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 24, 1999 [hereinafter
Dash Testimony]; John Q. Barrett Open Session Statement Before the United States
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing on the Future of the Independent
Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 17, 1999.
91. See Statement of Kenneth Starr Before the United States Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs Hearing on the Future of the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC.
CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 [hereinafter Starr Testimony]; see also Statement of
Professor Julie R. O’Sullivan, Senate Government Affairs, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE,
Mar. 24, 1999; Statement of Janet Reno Attorney General Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Concerning the Independent Counsel Act, FED.
DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 17, 1999 [hereinafter Reno Testimony]; Statement of Wil-

COOK-FIN.DOC

1367]

THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE

4/5/00 7:26 AM

1385

During the reauthorization debate, structural concerns
formed the basis for much of the opposition. Replete and varied
in nature, the criticism expressed left few aspects of the statute
untainted. The foci of the structural disfavor included the statute’s low threshold for the appointment of independent counsels;92 the statute’s disallowance for the selection of highly
qualified independent counsels and for the adequate prioritization of cases and resources;93 reporting requirements that frequently subjected those who were not charged with a crime to
severe criticism;94 the statute’s inability to adequately account
for the scope and length of independent counsel investigations
and expenditures;95 and Attorney General preclusion from utilizing subpoenas, the grand jury, and grants of immunity during preliminary investigations.96
Above the statutory critiques, however, lay an overriding
criticism that was recurrent throughout the debate: namely,
that the statute failed in its primary purpose—to engender
public confidence in, and remove politics from, the prosecution
of Executive Branch officials. The most notable opponents to
reauthorization, Attorney General Janet Reno and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, expressed their concern that the
independent counsel law failed in its principal mission. As
stated by Reno:

liam P. Barr Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Concerning the Independent Counsel Statute, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 10, 1999; Statement of
Robert S. Bennett Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, FED. DOC.
CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 3, 1999 [hereinafter Bennett Testimony]; Repealing the Independent Counsel Act, Statement of Alcee Hastings, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar.
2, 1999.
92. See Statement of Chairman Fred Thompson Hearing on the Independent
Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 17, 1999 [hereinafter Thompson Testimony].
93. See Statement of Benjamin R. Civiletti Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Concerning the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar.
10, 1999.
94. See id.
95. See Statement of Philip S. Anderson on Behalf of the American Bar Association Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee
on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives on the Subject of the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 10, 1999.
96. See Bennett Testimony, supra note 91.
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Whenever a high-level official is accused of wrongdoing,
the stakes are high. Almost by definition, these are significant
cases that generate a lot of interest—in the newspapers, up
here on Capitol Hill, and in political circles across the country. As a consequence, just about every decision becomes controversial—be it an Attorney General decision whether to
trigger the Act and seek the appointment of an independent
counsel, or an independent counsel’s decision to pursue a particular prosecutorial course. And I have come to believe that
the statute puts the Attorney General in a no-win situation.
Or, as I have said in the past: an Attorney General is criticized if she triggers the statute, and criticized if she doesn’t.
On the other side of the equation, the decisions of an independent counsel are no less subject to criticism and secondguessing. . . . I’m just saying that it is natural, and that this
climate of criticism and controversy weakens—rather than
strengthens—the public’s confidence in the impartial exercise
of prosecutorial power. And that, at the end of the day, undercuts the purpose of the Act. Instead of giving people confidence in the system, the Act creates an artificial process that
divides responsibility and fragments accountability.97

Starr added his persepective as an independent counsel:
[I]ndependent Counsels are vulnerable in a larger sense . . . .
In high-profile cases, as Professor Julie O’Sullivan (ph) testified, . . . “those under investigation or their political allies
have every incentive to impugn the integrity and impartiality
of any statutory [independent counsel] who . . . uncovers
wrongdoing.” For presidents who are under investigation,
Henry Ruth . . . observed, the lesson of recent history is:
“[A]ttack, attack, attack the lawyers, attack the witnesses, attack the prosecutor, attack the laws the prosecutor seeks to
enforce.”. . .
. . . [T]here are several dimensions to this attack strategy.
First, independence can be misrepresented as antagonism.
Second, the Department of Justice, which has incentives to
come to the aid of a U.S. Attorney or a regulatory independent
counsel, has no incentive to help a statutory Independent
Counsel. With no institutional defender, independent counsels are especially vulnerable to partisan attack. In this
fashion, the legislative effort to take politics out of law

97. Reno Testimony, supra note 91.
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enforcement sometimes has the ironic effect of further politicizing it.98

Yet, even among those who questioned the wisdom of reauthorization, there was a realization that the alternative, allowing the law to expire, was, at best, an imperfect remedy. As
stated by Senator Fred Thompson:
We may conclude that, on balance, it is best to let the Independent Counsel Law expire and allow the authority to revert
back to the Justice Department. However, as we can see, such
a prospect raises the question as to what to do about the conflict of interest and public perception problem that remains
when an Attorney General insists on keeping in-house a matter involving the President. I would suggest it is going to require much more effort on the part of Congress both in the
confirmation process and with regard to its oversight responsibilities. And I think it is ultimately going to require more
vigilance by the American people.99

B. Shortcomings of the Arguments Against Renewal
To predict whether the independent counsel statute will
remain in its defunct state or will ultimately be revived is a
speculative task. In this regard, former Senator Howard
Baker’s suggestion to Congress that there be a “cooling off period”100 prior to any definitive decision seemed particularly cogent to many, including members of Congress.101 Indeed, it is
my belief that the statute should be revived with several modifications.102 For to return the function of investigating and
prosecuting Executive Branch officials to the Attorney General
would ignore, or improperly discount, principles of conflict of
interest and appearance of impropriety.103

98. Starr Testimony, supra note 91.
99. Thompson Testimony, supra note 92.
100. National Digest, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 25, 1999, at 2A.
101. See Starr Testimony, supra note 91; Starr Denounces His Job, Defends His
Performance, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 15, 1999, at 1A.
102. See Cook, supra note 10, at 320-37.
103. See id. at 288-97. The instant article will not attempt to critique the various
proposals and criticisms with respect to the independent counsel statute; that was the
subject of the article I published in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. See
Cook, supra note 10. Rather, with respect to the arguments presented in opposition to
reauthorization, this article will restrict its analysis to the contention that the statute
must be abandoned due to its failure to foster public confidence.
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In fact, this is the principal shortcoming in the arguments
advanced by Reno and Starr. Their argument that the “climate
of criticism and controversy”104 and the vulnerability of independent counsels to partisan attack105 undermine public confidence in the prosecutorial process is of doubtless validity. Certainly, repeated allegations of partisanship and bias, especially
in high-profile cases, could have an adverse impact upon the
listening public.106 However, to utilize political and media attentiveness as the principal gauge by which to assess the statute’s integrity and effectiveness is misplaced.
What is ignored in the debate surrounding reauthorization
are the rights and perspective of the individual defendant. An
appearance of impropriety is of relevance not only to the publicat-large, but also on an individual level. The concept’s pertinence to criminal cases applies irrespective of the case’s origin
or magnitude, or whether it is celebrated or obscure.107
People v. Zimmer108 is illustrative of this principle.109 Defendant Graeme Zimmer “organized and managed” a business,
Zimmer Inc., which was located in Hamilton County in New
York State.110 However, after the enterprise began to experience certain economic hardships, Zimmer relinquished both his
corporate interest as well as his position in the company.111
Thereafter, “dissatisfied stockholders” assumed control of the
business and, inter alia, hired a Hamilton County District Attorney to serve as its corporate counsel.112 Approximately three
104. Reno Testimony, supra note 91.
105. See Starr Testimony, supra note 91.
106. For an extended and intriguing discussion of this argument, see Julie
O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 463, 463-79 (1996).
107. For an extended discussion of the applicability of conflict of interest principles to a defendant in a criminal prosecution, see Cook, supra note 10, at 288-97.
108. 414 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1980).
109. For an extended discussion of Zimmer in the context of prosecutorial conflict
of interests, see Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop Out of Copping a Plea: Eradicating
Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1357-58, 1364-65 (1998).
110. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d at 706.
111. See id.
112. Id. Though incorporated, the business operated more as a “one-man enterprise” than as an incorporated entity. As noted by the court:
For a long time, by what appears to have been at least silent acquiescence of the
other investors, no reins were placed on his managerial conduct, or, if they were,
they were not enforced. During his regime, no stockholders’ meetings were ever
held and when, midst a corporate financial crisis in the spring of 1977, he elected
to surrender his corporate holdings and resign, it had been nearly 10 years since
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months after his retention, the District Attorney, who also
happened to be a stockholder in the company,113 sought and obtained a multi-count indictment charging Zimmer with an array of criminal offenses associated with his business practices.114 During the pertinent time period, the District Attorney,
who also tried the case, retained his dual status as stockholder
and corporate counsel.115
On appeal, Zimmer presented a conflict of interest argument—namely, that the District Attorney should have been
disqualified given his relationship with the corporation and
that the trial court, therefore, erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment; the Court of Appeals of New York
agreed. 116 As a prefatory rationale, the Court noted the duty
owed by the prosecutor to both the public and the individual
defendant:
Central to the issue so sharply drawn is the pivotal point at
which a public prosecutor stands in the criminal justice system. Unlike other participants in the traditional common-law
adversarial process, whose more singular function is to protect and advance the rights of one side, a District Attorney
carries an additional and more sensitive burden. It is not
enough for him to be intent on the prosecution of his case.
Granted that his paramount obligation is to the public, he
must never lose sight of the fact that a defendant, as an integral member of the body politic, is entitled to a full measure of
fairness. Put another way, his mission is not so much to convict as it is to achieve a just result.117

Thus, the prosecutor, at a minimum, has dual fidelities; he is
obligated to pursue the interests of the people as well as to ensure that justice is not breached. The attainment of justice,
however, is compromised whenever a prosecutor is permitted to
pursue a prosecution despite the presence of a conflict of interest. In such an instance, it is not the pulse of the general public, as Reno and Starr suggest, that is gauged to determine
whether the pursuit is nonetheless worthwhile. Rather, it is

the directors had met.

Id.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
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the perspective of the defendant that is of equal, if not paramount, significance. Moreover, the argument that the Department of Justice is fully capable of investigating, and prosecuting, alleged Executive Branch wrongdoing, either internally or
via a departmental appointment of a special prosecutor, is
similarly without force.118 No matter how noble the intentions,
or competent the prosecutors, an appearance of impropriety exists,119 particularly from the perspective of the defendant.120

118. See Reno Testimony, supra note 91. Reno elaborated upon her contention that
the independent counsel statute should lapse and that the investigative function
should be returned to the Department of Justice:
But let me be clear, also, about what our position does not mean. It does not
mean that allegations of high-level corruption should be pursued with anything
less than the utmost vigor and seriousness of purpose. And it does not mean that
the Department considers itself capable of pursuing, in the ordinary course, each
and every allegation of corruption at the highest levels of our government. We
know that, sometimes, a special prosecutor is in order.
Yet we have come to believe that the country would be best served by a return to the system that existed before the Independent Counsel Act—when the
Justice Department took responsibility for all but the most exceptional of cases
against high-ranking public officials, and when the Attorney General exercised the
authority to appoint a special prosecutor in exceptional situations. . . .
When high-level officials have been accused of wrongdoing, the Department
has not hesitated to fully investigate. Over the last two decades, the Department
of Justice has obtained the convictions of 13,345 public officials and employees
from both sides of the political aisle.

Id.
119. See Dash Testimony, supra note 90. Senator Dash noted that Attorney General Reno, in 1993, supported reauthorization based upon an inherent conflict of interest that exists whenever the Executive Branch is asked to investigate itself:
Then, in 1993, in a remarkable turnaround for the Justice Department, Attorney General Reno appeared before this Committee and enthusiastically urged
the Committee to reauthorize the legislation. She rejected prior Justice Department claims that the department had no conflict in investigating high executive
branch officials. Instead, she stated that the reason she supported the independent
counsel legislation was that “there is an inherent conflict whenever senior executive branch officials are to be investigated by the department and its appointed
head, the Attorney General.” . . . She said in 1993:
The Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the president. Recognition of
this conflict does not belittle or demean the professionalism of the department’s
career prosecutors. . . . They are not political, they are splendid lawyers . . . I still
feel there will be a need for this legislation, based on my experience as a prosecutor for 15 years in Dade County. It is absolutely essential for the public, in the process of the criminal justice system, to have confidence in that system, and you
cannot do that when there is a conflict or an appearance of conflict in the person
who is, in effect, the chief prosecutor.

Id.
120. See Cook, supra note 10, at 296-97 (1998) (observing, inter alia, though internal Executive Branch investigations and prosecutions will produce a perception, if not
a reality, that the subject of those investigations will benefit from favorable treatment,
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And, no matter how firmly and conscientiously a District Attorney may steel himself against the intrusion of a competing
and disqualifying interest, he never can be certain that he has
succeeded in isolating himself from the inroads on his subconscious . . . .
....
Assuming he intended to be as fair and objective as fair
could be, in presenting this evidence where did his role as
partisan corporate attorney end and where did that of nonpartisan District Attorney begin? At what point was he serving which of his two masters? To put the questions is to state
the problem, a problem instinct with due process implications.
Moreover, even if the actuality or potentiality of prejudice
were absent, what of the appearance of things? No matter the
good faith and complete integrity of the District Attorney, under these circumstances what impression could the defendant
have had of the fairness of a prosecution instituted by one
with the personal and financial attachments of this prosecutor? Would it have been unreasonable for the defendant—or
others—to doubt that the public officer, whose burden it was
to screen the complaint for frivolousness and, if necessary,
guide its destiny before the Grand Jury, would do so disinterestedly?
It was important that these responsibilities, carried out in
the name of the State and under the color of law, be conducted in a manner that fostered rather than discouraged
public confidence in our government and the system of law to
which it is dedicated. . . . In particular, the District Attorney,
as guardian of this public trust, should have abstained from
an identification, in appearance as well as in fact, with more
than one side of the controversy.121

The unavoidable conflict of interest inherent in internal
Executive Branch prosecutions necessarily compromises principles of fairness and appearances of propriety with respect to
the investigation and prosecution of high-ranking Executive
Branch officials. The dual loyalties owed by the Executive
this may not always be the reality and at times the subject may be prosecuted not due
to the evidence accrued during a particular investigation but rather to appease political
opponents).
121. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d. at 707-08 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Branch prosecutor produces an appearance problem that adversely skews the perceived fairness of such prosecutions in the
eyes of both the individual defendant and the public at large.
Therefore, it is essential that a prosecutorial process be in
place that ensures, from the perspective of the defendant as
well as the public, that high-ranking members of the Executive
Branch are fairly and equitably investigated and prosecuted for
alleged criminal wrongdoing.122 Indeed, both the apparent and
actual fairness of a prosecutorial process is necessarily rooted
in the integrity of the procedures it adopts; for if the procedures
adopted are intrinsically just, the fairness of the process, in appearance and in fact, will transcend any adverse criticism.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
With this in mind, I have proposed certain reforms to the
independent counsel law which, I submit, effectively mandate
compliance with Department of Justice regulations,123 preserve
prosecutorial independence, promote fairness, and avoid the
appearances of impropriety inextricably associated with statutory abandonment.124 A recurrent, disquieting concern vociferously expressed during the reauthorization debate pertained to
the exercise of independent counsel discretion with respect to
investigative strategies. Many believed that some independent

122. See Lieberman Testimony, supra note 90.
Twenty years ago, when Watergate was the nation’s most recent resonant political
scandal, Congress passed the statute we’re now reviewing. Our predecessors were
clearly motivated by the highest of ideals, to ensure that the rule of law would be
applied scrupulously even in cases involving our nation’s most powerful leaders,
even in cases involving the president. In my opinion, the law has worked in support of that worthy purpose more often than not. And I note that most Americans
seem to agree; at least that’s what the polls indicate, which show that a healthy
majority actually supports reauthorization of the statute, notwithstanding the recent controversies that have surrounded it.

Id.
123. The United States Attorneys’ Manual regulates the conduct of United States
Attorneys and their Assistants with respect to certain pretrial, plea, and post-trial
practices. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-2.400 (1997). The Manual,
which is part of the aforementioned regulations of the Department of Justice, consists
of an array of regulations that require reporting to, consultation with, or approval
from, the Department of Justice prior to the pursuit by a prosecutor of a wide array of
pretrial, plea, and post-trial strategies. See Conference, The Independent Counsel Process: Is it Broken and How Should it Be Fixed? 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1546
(1997) [hereinafter Conference].
124. For an extended discussion of these proposed reforms, see Cook, supra note
10, at 316-36.
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counsels, particularly Kenneth Starr, habitually disregarded
Department of Justice guidelines during the conduct of their
affairs.125 Indeed, in light of the permissive language of § 594(f),
the periodic failure of independent counsels to adhere to Department of Justice regulations should have been anticipated.126 Though I concur with many of the aforementioned
sentiments, I disagree that the solution lies in statutory disso125. See Lieberman Testimony, supra note 90.
The Department of Justice is currently considering whether Judge Starr failed to
follow certain Department of Justice guidelines which are supposed to apply to
every citizen. So I’d be interested in learning how much weight Judge Starr gave
to those guidelines in his conduct as independent counsel. How he feels about the
guidelines and whether we should find a way to better emphasize adherence to
them and receive consultations—require consultations with the department.

Id.; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999 (testimony of Senator Levin). Senator Levin stated:
Looking at the record of your office, Mr. Starr, in my judgment, despite our best efforts to establish reasonable limits on the power of independent counsels, you and
your office have managed to exceed those limits. In the ABC News case, you stated
to the court that the relevant Justice Department regulations did “[n]ot govern an
independent counsel.” In my judgment, you’ve gone beyond what an average
prosecutor would do in the investigation of a private citizen and you have failed to
comply with Justice Department policies as intended under the Independent
Counsel law. . . . So the key limits that the law intended to put on the power of independent counsels have not proven effective. And I believe that we need to determine in the months ahead whether or not we can amend the statute or remedy
that problem as I perceive it, so that the limits on power which are so important to
the constitutionality of this statute and to its fairness can be made practically effective.

Id.; see also Torricelli Testimony, supra note 89. Addressing Independent Counsel
Starr, Senator Torricelli stated, “The Lewinsky matter, the Steele matter, the Willey
matter are an example of what unchecked power does to good people. Julie Hiatt
Steele’s daughter’s boyfriend was questioned before the grand jury about whether she
(sic) ever had sex with Mrs. Steele. How much worse does this get?” Id. In U.S. Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs Holds Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act,
FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE, Apr. 14, 1999, Senator Specter testified:
One of the objections which was raised, and I do not know the factual basis, is that
an immunity grant had been given without counsel being present and it was not in
conformity with Department of Justice rules. . . . And I’m not saying you were
wrong, but I’m trying to address their concerns, or what other independent counsel
has done . . . .

Id.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1) (1994) provides:
An independent counsel shall, except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter, comply with the written or other established
policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws.
To determine these policies . . . the independent counsel shall, except to the extent
that doing so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter, consult with
the Department of Justice.

Id. (emphasis added). See also supra notes 34, 59, 84 and accompanying text.
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lution. Rather, via amendments to the statute, independent
counsel conduct can be effectively regulated and subjected to
the policies of the Justice Department.
To achieve this objective, independent counsels should be
required to adhere to the following two-pronged procedure.
First, whenever an independent counsel seeks to pursue a pretrial, plea, or post-trial strategy which is regulated by the
United States Attorneys’ Manual, the independent counsel
must report to, consult with, or obtain approval from a designated Department of Justice official prior to embarking upon
the endeavor.127 If the Department of Justice approves the proposed course of action, the independent counsel may then proceed. If, however, approval is not received, the independent
counsel has a second option. This alternative, which may only
be pursued upon satisfaction of the first prong, permits an independent counsel to present her pretrial, plea, or post-trial
request to the division of the court. The Department of Justice
will, of course, be permitted to present arguments in opposition. If authorization is received from the court, the independent counsel may pursue the requested conduct.128
There are several distinct advantages to this proposal.
First, it restrains the unbridled pursuit of questionable prosecutorial strategies. By mandating compliance with the United
States Attorneys’ Manual, and thus consultation with the Department of Justice, an independent counsel will be disinclined
to pursue legal practices disfavored by the Department. In or-

127. I am not suggesting that an independent counsel be subject to every regulation contained within the United States Attorneys’ Manual. Instead, only those provisions consistent with Morrison v. Olson should be made applicable. For a general overview of the United States Attorneys’ Manual, including discussion of its underlying
purpose, see infra note 149 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of
this proposal and its constitutionality, see infra notes 130-234 and accompanying text.
128. I have also proposed additional modifications to the statute which will, inter
alia, more effectively regulate independent counsel conduct and improve appearances
of propriety with respect to the selection of independent counsels and the prosecutorial
process. For detailed descriptions of these proposals and the underlying rationales, see
Cook, supra note 10, at 333-36 (Cook recommended that the division of the court “be
increased from three to five judges, with two of the positions reserved for judges who
have been appointed by presidents belonging to the incumbent’s political party. The
remaining three positions should be filled by judges appointed by presidents from the
opposing political party. I also propose a unanimity requirement among the [division of
the court] judges with respect to the selection of an independent counsel”; that independent counsels be subjected to fixed expenditure limits; and that an independent
counsel seeking to extend his investigation be required to apply annually to the division of the court.).
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der to limit monetary and prosecutorial inefficiency costs, the
proposal provides an incentive to engage in only those strategic
ventures that will promote, rather than hinder, investigative
efficacy. An independent counsel who surmises that a questionable legal strategy is likely to be resisted by the Department of Justice will be disinclined to sacrifice prosecutorial efficiency in order to engage in a protracted appeal before the
division of the court.
The proposal also guards against Department of Justice infringement upon an independent counsel investigation. The
suggested measure disallows Attorney General initiated review
of independent counsel activity as well as veto authority of proposed prosecutorial strategies. Instead, if so pursued, the division of the court would adjudicate any unresolved disputes between the Department of Justice and the independent counsel.
By preserving independent counsel autonomy, the proposal
thus carefully avoids the inherent conflict of interest and appearance pitfalls inextricably associated with a return of prosecutorial functions to the Attorney General.
Finally, the proposal would entail only minimal economic
costs. In all, only twenty independent counsel investigations
have been commenced.129 Given such, the Justice Department
and the division of the court would likely incur only minimal
added economic and workload costs. This cost is further minimized with respect to the division of the court. As noted, the
division of the court has no authority under the proposal to initiate a review of independent counsel activity. Only if the independent counsel decides to pursue division of the court review
does the court incur the costs pursuant to this proposal.
Aside from these benefits, however, critics of the statute
will undoubtedly challenge the measure’s constitutionality.
Any proposal that positively affects the duties and responsibilities of the Special Division will be greeted, at a minimum, with
great reservation. However, a review of the proposal in light of
the Supreme Court case which upheld the constitutionality of
the statute, Morrison v. Olson,130 will demonstrate that the
proposal, rather than offering radical change, is a constitutionally sound and measured response to the public and individual
129. Of the 20 independent counsel investigations, 11 have concluded without a
returned indictment. See Todd S. Purdum, Former Special Counsels See Need to Alter
Law That Created Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at A1.
130. 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988).
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need to ensure fairness and appearances of propriety and to
guard against the aberrant exercise of independent counsel
discretion.
A. Morrison v. Olson
The Morrison case emanated from a dispute between the
House of Representatives and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), with respect to the latter’s limited responsiveness to House subpoenas requesting the production of certain
documents.131 In 1982, the House of Representatives was investigating the enforcement by the EPA and the Land and Natural
Resources Division of the Department of Justice of the “Superfund Law.”132 Pursuant to this investigation, two House subcommittees issued subpoenas to the EPA, requesting the production of certain documents. The EPA, acting on orders from
President Ronald Reagan, invoked executive privilege and refused to turn over the documents.133 After the EPA Administrator was held in contempt, and a lawsuit was filed by the EPA
and the United States against the House, the parties reached a
compromise which allowed the House “limited access to the
documents.”134
In 1983, the House Judiciary Committee held hearings to
ascertain the role of the Justice Department in the aforesaid
dispute.135 Among those who testified before a House subcommittee was Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General for
131. See id. at 665. See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison v. Olson: A Modest Assessment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255, 257 (1989).
132. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665 (explaining that the purpose underlying the
“Superfund Law” was the cleanup of toxic waste); HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 95.
133. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665. It was the EPA’s contention that the documents “contained ‘enforcement sensitive information.’ ” Id.
134. Id.
135. Earl Dudley, Deputy to eventual Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison, described the tense political battle which preceded their investigation:
[O]ur investigation was focused on allegations that an earlier investigation of the
EPA documents affair by the House Judiciary Committee—an investigation called
for by the Speaker of the House and several House committee chairmen—had been
obstructed by officials at the highest levels of the Reagan Justice Department.
Particularly under Attorney General Meese, the Justice Department was the bête
noir of Democrats in general and congressional Democrats in particular, and the
Department had deeply offended House Members on both sides of the aisle by suing the House of Representatives in the name of “the United States” in an effort to
forestall a contempt prosecution of the Administrator of the EPA for withholding
the disputed documents.

Dudley, supra note 131, at 257.
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the Office of Legal Counsel.136 Two years later, the House issued a report detailing its investigation which, inter alia, intimated that Olson had lied during his testimony.137 The report
further suggested that both Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, and Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources Division, had obstructed the House’s investigation by illegally withholding
requested documents.138
Pursuant to a House request for the appointment of an independent counsel, the Public Integrity Section was requested
by the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation.139 Despite the Section’s ultimate recommendation that an
independent counsel be appointed to investigate Olson,
Schmults, and Dinkins,140 the Attorney General disregarded
this advice and requested “the appointment of an independent
counsel solely with respect to Olson.”141
James C. McKay was the original independent counsel
named by the division of the court. However, due to a conflict of
interest, he relinquished the post one month after his appointment, and was replaced by his chief deputy, Alexia Morrison.142
Morrison was given jurisdiction to determine
“whether the testimony of . . . Olson and his revision of such
testimony on March 10, 1983, violated either 18 U.S.C. § 1505
or § 1001, or any other provision of federal law.” The court
also ordered that the independent counsel
shall have jurisdiction to investigate any other allegation
of evidence of violation of any Federal criminal law by
Theodore Olson developed during investigations, by the
Independent Counsel, referred to above, and connected

136. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665-66.
137. See id. at 666. The report was issued on December 5, 1985, and was approximately 3000 pages. See HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 96.
138. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666.
139. See id.
140. Professor Harriger observes that the report
suggested that all three should be subject to the investigation because the case appeared to involve “a seamless web of events” that could not be adequately investigated in isolation. It concluded that any effort to separate the allegations and individuals out would be “artificial” and “may impede the independent counsel’s ability
to fully explore the allegations.”

HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 96.
141. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666.
142. See id. at 667; HARRIGER, supra note 48, at 96.
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with or arising out of that investigation, and Independent
Counsel shall have jurisdiction to prosecute for any such
violation. . . .143

During the course of her investigation, however, Morrison
sought to have the matters involving Schmults and Dinkins referred to her as “related matters.”144 The Special Division refused, concluding that the Attorney General’s decision was unreviewable. Nonetheless, the court construed its original
jurisdictional grant as authorizing Morrison to investigate
whether Olson, Schmults, and Dinkins conspired to obstruct
the congressional inquiry.145 Thereafter, Morrison issued grand
jury subpoenas to Olson, Schmults, and Dinkins, who, in turn,
moved to quash on the grounds that, inter alia, the independent counsel statute was unconstitutional.146 The district court
upheld the statute’s constitutionality but was later reversed by
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.147 In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court found, inter alia, that
the authority vested in the division of the court to appoint an
independent counsel did not violate the appointments clause;
that Article III was not violated given that the powers assigned
to the division of the court were either analogous to functions
performed by the judiciary or amounted to, at most, a de minimis intrusion upon the Executive Branch; and that the statute
did not violate principles of separation of powers.148
Unlike independent counsels, the pretrial, post-trial, and
plea practices of United States Attorneys and Assistant United
States Attorneys are largely regulated by the United States Attorneys’ Manual. The purpose of the Manual is to ensure the
impartial exercise of investigative and prosecutorial strategies
and policies across the country by Department prosecutors. As
stated by former United States Attorney and Whitewater Independent Counsel Robert Fiske:
As United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, I was part of the Department of Justice, headed, of
course, by the Attorney General in Washington, and there is a

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 667 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id. at 668.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 670-97.
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whole system of review procedures in place that control what
Assistant U.S. Attorneys or United States Attorneys can do in
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. You can’t
take certain kinds of investigative steps, like subpoenaing
members of the media. You can’t bring certain kinds of cases,
such as racketeering cases, without getting the approval of
career people in the Justice Department. And the whole purpose of that is so that there can be a uniform, cohesive system
of law enforcement throughout the United States, with the
centralized control in Washington, to make sure that some
Assistant or some U.S. Attorney isn’t going off half-cocked in
a way that would be detrimental to law enforcement in general.149

As detailed in the above statutory chronology, Congress has
thrice constructed the language of § 594(f) in an attempt to
mandate independent counsel compliance with Department of
Justice policies, yet respect the independence necessary to ensure the actual and apparent impartial exercise of prosecutorial discretion.150 In the minds of many, including this author,
the attempt to balance these objectives has, thus far, proved
unsuccessful.151
I submit, however, that my proposal, requiring Attorney
General approval, with an option for review by the division of
the court whenever certain provisions of the United States Attorneys’ Manual are implicated, effectively addresses this ongoing congressional effort to regulate independent counsel discretion. By requiring Attorney General consultation, this proposal
mandates actual compliance with Department of Justice policies and further preserves the appearance of propriety by permitting the independent counsel to seek refuge in the division
of the court from an adverse departmental determination.
Thus, the inherent conflicts associated with Attorney General
control over Executive Branch prosecutions are avoided, while
prosecutorial independence is preserved. Moreover, as the following discussion amply illustrates, when reviewed in light of
the Morrison case, the proposal is constitutionally sound, as
well.

149. Conference, supra note 123, at 1546.
150. See supra notes 34, 59, and 84 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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B. Pretrial Practices
1. Personal conversations
An appropriate place to begin this critique is through a review of the succession of regulations that govern prosecutorial
behavior with respect to the interception of personal communications. For example, Department approval is required prior to
a prosecutor applying for, or seeking an extension of, a court
order “authorizing the interception of wire, oral and/or electronic communications”;152 prior to intercepting roving wire and
oral communications;153 for emergency interceptions under 18
U.S.C. § 2518(7) without a court order;154 to employ video surveillance “when there is a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy requiring judicial authorization”;155 and to inter152. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-7.110. This section
provides:
[T]he Electronic Surveillance Unit of the Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement
Operations will conduct the initial review of the necessary pleadings, which include:
A. The affidavit of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” of the United
States, . . . with such affidavit setting forth the facts of the investigation that establish the basis for those probable cause (and other) statements required by Title
III to be included in the application;
B. The application by any United States Attorney or his/her Assistant, . . . that
provides the basis for the court’s jurisdiction to sign an order authorizing the requested interception of wire, oral, and/or electronic communications; and
C. A set of orders to be signed by the court authorizing the government to intercept, or approving the interception of, the wire, oral and/or electronic communications that are the subject of the application. . . .

Id.
153. See id. § 9-7.111. This section reads, “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (11)(a)
and (b), the government may obtain authorization to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications of specifically named subjects without specifying with particularity
the premises within, or the facilities over which, the communications will be intercepted.” Id.
154. See id. § 9-7.112. This regulation states:
Title III contains a provision which allows for the warrantless, emergency interception of wire, oral, and/or electronic communications. . . . As defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (7), an emergency situation involves either: (1) immediate danger of death
or serious bodily injury to any person; (2) conspiratorial activities threatening the
national security interest; or (3) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime. . . . Once the AG, the DAG, or the AssocAG authorizes the law enforcement agency to proceed with the emergency Title III, the government then
has forty-eight (48) hours, from the time the authorization was granted, to obtain
a court order approving the emergency interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (7).

Id.
155. Id. § 9-7.200. This section provides:
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cept nontelephonic verbal communications when less than all
the parties are consenting to the interception, when the interception pertains to congressional members, federal judges, and
certain members of the Executive Branch, among others, for
certain specified offenses.156
Recognizing that Article III of the Constitution restricts
federal judicial authority to “Cases” and “Controversies,”157 and
that nonjudicial executive or administrative duties may not be
imposed upon the judiciary,158 the majority in Morrison, nonetheless, held that the independent counsel statute did not violate these limitations. In so finding, the Court initially noted
the two-fold rationale attendant to these limitations; namely,
“to help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to
prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for
the other branches.”159 Indeed, these rationales would underlie
much of the Court’s Article III analysis.
At various points in its opinion, the Court identified,
grouped, and critiqued under Article III certain powers granted
via the statute to the division of the court.160 In each instance,
the bestowed responsibilities withstood constitutional scrutiny.
Of particular note was the Court’s review of those delegated
powers that “do require the court to exercise some judgment

[C]ertain officials of the Criminal Division have been delegated authority to review
requests to use video surveillance for law enforcement purposes when there is a
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy requiring judicial authorization. . . . When court authorization for video surveillance is deemed necessary, it
should be obtained by way of an application and order predicated on Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(b) and the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651).

Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. § 9-7.302.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
Id. at 678.
The Court detailed the following duties:

These duties include granting extensions for the Attorney General’s preliminary
investigation; receiving the report of the Attorney General at the conclusion of his
preliminary investigation; referring matters to the counsel upon request; receiving
reports from the counsel regarding expenses incurred; receiving a report from the
Attorney General following the removal of an independent counsel; granting attorney’s fees upon request to individuals who were investigated but not indicted by an
independent counsel; receiving a final report from the counsel; deciding whether to
release the counsel’s final report to Congress or the public and determining
whether any protective orders should be issued; and terminating an independent
counsel when his or her task is completed.

Id. at 680 (citations omitted).
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and discretion.”161 Characterizing the duties assigned as “directly analogous to functions that federal judges perform in
other contexts,” the Court expounded upon this claim by providing several concrete examples of its logic.162 Among the comparisons drawn was the authority of the federal courts to review applications for wiretaps, which the Supreme Court
observed “may require a court to consider the nature and scope
of criminal investigations on the basis of evidence or affidavits
submitted in an ex parte proceeding.”163
Title 18, United States Code § 2516, the federal statute
which authorizes this judicial approval and oversight authority
with respect to communicative interceptions, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General [among
several other Department of Justice officials], may authorize
an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction
for, and such judge may grant in conformity with § 2518 of
this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications . . . .164

Section 2518 further expounds upon this judicial authority:
(5) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the
objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than
thirty days. . . . Extensions of an order may be granted, but
only upon application for an extension . . . and the court making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section. The
period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing
judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it
was granted and in no event for longer than thirty days.165

Hence, pursuant to these statutes, a federal judge may, inter alia, authorize, extend, and terminate the government’s
utilization of electronic eavesdropping. Indeed, privacy concerns underlie this judicial role. It is well recognized that governmental interception of personal conversations can implicate

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 681-82 n.20.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2518(5) (emphasis added).
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an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights.166 Given
such, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to screen governmental
activity that potentially infringes constitutional protections.
Thus, through the review of government wiretap and other related applications, the courts can assess the merits underlying
such governmental requests and necessarily preempt undue
governmental interference with individual constitutional liberties. Moreover, by monitoring previously approved governmental interceptions, the courts necessarily guard against subsequent infringements of Fourth Amendment rights.
Sections 9-7.110, 9-7.111, 9-7.112, 9-7.200, and 9-7.302 of
the United States Attorneys’ Manual fall squarely within this
province of judicial activity. All pertain to the interception of
verbal communications or visual conduct, and, with the exception of section 9-7.302, expressly reference the authority of the
federal courts with respect to such matters.167 Moreover, all, either potentially or in fact, implicate Fourth Amendment interests. The division of the court, upon independent counsel request, would simply be required, under my proposal, to review
and render a decision with respect to the propriety of proposed
governmental interceptions of verbal and visual communications. Nothing more is required. Hence, the contemplated judicial functions are perfectly congruous with the judicial review
authority cited with approval in Morrison.
2. Grand jury
As with wiretaps, a Department prosecutor’s grand juryrelated activity is similarly subject to a vast array of regulations. For example, before a grand jury subpoena can be served
upon a target of an investigation, the United States Attorneys’
Manual mandates that prior approval be obtained from either

166. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
167. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1993) (reviewing propriety of government’s application to the district court for an order authorizing a warrant
to engage in roving electronic surveillance); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that government’s application with the district court for an order authorizing the use of video surveillance was proper); United States v. Bailin, No.
89 CR 668, 1990 WL 16437 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 1990) (holding that government was not
required to seek judicial approval prior to engaging in the interception of oral communications where communication at issue did not implicate a Fourth Amendment interest); United States v. Crouch, 666 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that no
emergency existed which justified interception of telephone conversations absent judicial approval).
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the United States Attorney or the Assistant Attorney General.168 Similarly, approval must also precede the resubpoenaing of a contumacious witness before successive grand juries, as
well as the pursuit of civil contempt sanctions against the witness,169 the requesting of judicial permission to release grand
jury materials to state and local law enforcement officials,170
and the impaneling of a special grand jury pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3331(a).171
Finally, there are a series of regulations pertinent to the
initiation of grand jury reports. For instance, section 9-11.330
requires that notification be provided when a § 3331(a) “special
grand jury will be considering the issuance of a report” or will
be preparing a report which was not requested by the United
States Attorney.172 Likewise, approval must be obtained before
a draft special grand jury report may be submitted to a §
3331(a) special grand jury,173 and consultation is required before any regular or special grand jury report may be initiated.174
In its Article III analysis, the Supreme Court further
analogized the judicial function under the statute to the judicial role with respect to the grand jury. The Court observed
that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), the
168. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-11.150. This
section reads, in part:
However, in the context of particular cases such a subpoena may carry the appearance of unfairness. Because the potential for misunderstanding is great, before a known “target” (citation omitted) is subpoenaed to testify before the grand
jury about his or her involvement in the crime under investigation, an effort
should be made to secure the target’s voluntary appearance. If a voluntary appearance cannot be obtained, the target should be subpoenaed only after the grand
jury and the United States Attorney or the responsible Assistant Attorney General
have approved the subpoena.

Id.
169. See id. § 9-11.160. This regulation provides, in pertinent part:
Prior authorization must be obtained from the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to resubpoena a witness before the successive grand jury as well as to
seek civil contempt sanctions should the witness persist in his or her refusal to
testify. To obtain approval, the prosecutor must show either : (a) that the witness
is prepared to testify; or (b) that the appearance of the witness is justified since the
witness possesses information essential to the investigation.

Id.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. § 9-11.260.
See id. § 9-11.300.
Id. § 9-11.330.
See id.
See id. § 9-11.101.
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federal judiciary was empowered to determine whether grand
jury matters could be disclosed and whether a grand jury investigation could be extended.175 It was also noted that the
courts “have traditionally supervised grand juries and assisted
in their ‘investigative function’ by, if necessary, compelling the
testimony of witnesses.”176
Each of the cited provisions of the United States Attorneys’
Manual directly corresponds to these judicial grand jury activities. As noted, the federal judiciary is charged with manifold
duties with respect to the grand jury, including compelling testimonial evidence. Thus, whenever a witness challenges the
service or issuance of a subpoena, it is the judiciary that must
adjudicate the dispute.177 Indeed, it was this type of dispute—a
subpoena challenge—that inspired Morrison v. Olson.178
The conduct contemplated in sections 9-11.150 (targets) and
9-11.160 (contumacious witnesses) is plainly analogous to this
judicial function. Each is concerned with the service and issuance of grand jury subpoenas to classified individuals, each necessitates judicial resolution in the event of a dispute, and each
explicitly acknowledges the inextricable judicial role associated
with such endeavors.179 Section 9-11.150, for example, cites to
175. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988).
176. Id. at 681 n.20 (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (“A
grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function without the court’s
aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses. It is the court’s process which summons the witness to attend and give testimony, and it is the court which
must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he refuses to do so.”)).
177. See United States v. Doe, 541 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to quash
subpoena requiring witness to appear before grand jury on account of alleged animosity
between the prosecutor and the witness); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Served Upon PHE, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Ky. 1992) (rejecting claim that grand
jury subpoena should be quashed on grounds that it was overly broad, unreasonable
and irrelevant to the grand jury’s investigation); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 557 F.
Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that grand jury subpoena should not be suppressed
on account of either attorney-client or work-product privileges); In re 1979 Grand Jury
Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. La. 1979) (holding that subpoena should not be
quashed on jurisdictional grounds; quashing subpoena duces tecum due to vagueness
and possible overly broad scope).
178. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. Section 9-11.160 also makes
reference to Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n.8 (1963), which recognizes
the authority of a court to compel a contumacious witness to comply with grand jury
subpoena through its civil and criminal contempt powers. Section 9-11.160’s requirement that departmental approval be obtained prior to the seeking of contempt sanctions is analogous to this judicial contempt authority. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-11.160.
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several cases that address challenges to the issuance of grand
jury subpoenas to investigative targets. One such case is
United States v. Wong.180 At issue was Wong’s claim that the
government violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights
when it failed to inform her that she had a right to remain silent when she, as a target of a criminal investigation, appeared
before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena.181 Finding no
abridgement of Wong’s Fifth Amendment rights, the Court observed, inter alia, that the Fifth Amendment did not protect
perjury and that there was no “unfairness” in summoning potential defendants to testify before the grand jury.182
The release of federal grand jury materials to state or local
authorities183 also has a judicial analogue, which is found in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(iv). That rule,
which requires judicial approval prior to the release of such information, provides, in pertinent part:
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made—
....
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney
for the government, upon a showing that such matters may
disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the
grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at
such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.184

Thus, the rule’s plain language contemplates an inseparable
association between a prosecutorial request to release such information and a judicial assessment of that request. Moreover,
the rule further empowers the court to establish the terms pur180. 431 U.S. 174 (1977).
181. See id. at 175. Wong was later indicted for rendering perjurious testimony
before the grand jury. See id. at 176.
182. See id. at 179.
183. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-11.260 (requiring Department of Justice approval prior to seeking judicial authority to share grand
jury information with state or local authorities).
184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iv) (emphasis added).
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suant to which the information may be disseminated.
The remaining provisions cited with respect to grand jury
activity are similarly consonant with recognized judicial activity. Sections 9-11.300, 9-11.330, and 9-11.101, which pertain to
the impaneling of special grand juries and the preparation of
grand jury reports, conform to the judicial grand jury oversight
function cited approvingly in Morrison. Title 18, United States
Code § 3331, which is cited directly or is referenced by each of
the aforementioned provisions, authorizes federal courts to impanel and extend the service of special grand juries.
(a) In addition to such other grand juries as shall be called
from time to time, each district court which is located in a judicial district containing more than four million inhabitants
or in which the Attorney General [or other Department of
Justice officials] certifies in writing to the chief judge of the
district that in his judgment a special grand jury is necessary
because of criminal activity in the district shall order a special grand jury to be summoned at least once in each period of
eighteen months unless another special grand jury is then
serving. . . . If, at the end of such term or any extension
thereof, the district court determines the business of the
grand jury has not been completed, the court may enter an
order extending such term for an additional period of six
months.185

Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3333 authorizes the federal judiciary to
“examine” and “accept” reports submitted by a special grand
jury.186
The above authority and application plainly evinces the
parallelism that exists between current judicial grand jury activities and the judicial conduct proffered pursuant to my proposal. Every cited grand jury regulation has an irrefutable
counterpart in an existing judicial function. Given such, the division of the court would, if requested, engage in judicial review
activity with unambiguous analogues to judicial grand jury
functions.
3. Search warrants
Prosecutorial discretion with respect to the utilization of
search warrants is, similarly, subject to the regulations prom185. 18 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (Supp. I 1977).
186. Id. § 3333(b).
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ulgated in the Manual. For example, a prosecutor must secure
Department of Justice approval before applying for a warrant
to search an attorney’s office,187 as well as for any of the following tangible items: documentary materials in the possession of
third party “physician[s], lawyer[s], or clergym[en]”;188 work
product materials or other documents belonging to individuals
“reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of
public communication[s]”;189 and evidence of certain criminal
tax offenses.190
It is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment affords protection to the individual “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”191 As a general matter, this Fourth Amendment right is
preserved by an independent judicial official who is empowered
to issue the warrants to search.192 In determining whether a
warrant will issue, the judicial officer will review affidavits, in
addition to any supporting testimonial evidence that may be
required.193
The searches described in sections 9-13.420, 9-19.220, 919.240, and 9-19.600 fall precisely within these confines: all
implicate Fourth Amendment interests; all require the submission of a search warrant application to a judicial officer; and all
necessitate a judicial finding of probable cause prior to execution.194 Notably, when equating judicial duties under the statute with preexisting judicial functions, the majority in Morri-

187. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-13.420.
188. Id. § 9-19.220.
189. Id. § 9-19.240.
190. See id. § 9-19.600.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (c)(1).
194. See Klitzman v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1984) (granting preliminary injunction with respect to search warrant which led to the seizure of documentary materials in the possession of a disinterested third person); United States v. Hunter, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998) (finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of a
warrant to search an attorney’s office); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that Secret Service’s seizure of
work product materials pursuant to a search warrant violated the Privacy Act of 1980).
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son cited approvingly to the authority of the federal courts to
issue search warrants. As with applications to engage in electronic interception, the Court observed that the review of
search warrants “may require a court to consider the nature
and scope of criminal investigations on the basis of evidence or
affidavits submitted in an ex parte proceeding.”195
The judicial duties contemplated pursuant to my proposal
require nothing different. Upon request of an independent
counsel, the division of the court would be required to consider
the nature and scope of a criminal investigation, as well as the
evidence submitted in support of the alleged need for the warrant. Such conduct is perfectly consonant with their preexisting
judicial function.
4. Trial subpoenas
The federal judiciary performs a similar function with respect to trial subpoenas. As with grand jury subpoenas, the judiciary must adjudge disputes that arise pursuant to challenges to trial subpoenas. In performing this function, the court
must consider the content of the trial subpoena, as well as the
facts accompanying its issuance.196 United States v. Crosland is
illustrative.197
The case stemmed from a government search, conducted on
October 2, 1992, of a residence leased by Maldonado Crosland
which resulted in the seizure of, inter alia, approximately 50
grams of cocaine base, $228,174 in United States currency, and
other drug-related paraphernalia.198 On October 22, 1992, a
search incident to Crosland’s arrest resulted in the recovery of
an additional $29,301 in United States currency, as well as the
seizure of Crosland’s automobile, a 1992 Nissan 300ZX.199 In an
effort to contest the forfeiture of his automobile, Crosland filed,
195. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 n.20 (1988).
196. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon PHE, Inc., 790 F.
Supp. 1310 (W.D. Ky. 1992) (rejecting claim that subpoena seeking certain business
records and documents was both overbroad and irrelevant); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 557 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (denying motions to quash on the asserted
grounds that the subpoenas violated attorney-client and work-product privileges); In re
1979 Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. La. 1979) (rejecting argument that
grand jury subpoena should be quashed on jurisdictional grounds and granting motion
to quash subpoena duces tecum on account of vagueness).
197. See United States v. Crosland, 821 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Va. 1993).
198. See id. at 1125.
199. See id.
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on February 2, 1993, an affidavit with the Drug Enforcement
Administration which declared that his current financial assets
consisted of $60 in cash and that he had only earned $20,000 to
$30,000 during the preceding twelve-month period.200 On February 23, 1993, the day after having learned of the affidavit,
the government served a grand jury subpoena duces tecum on
the law firm that was representing Crosland—Joseph,
Greenwald & Laake, P.A.201 The subpoena sought the production of “[a]ny and all documents and records concerning the
payment of any moneys by, or on behalf of, Maldonada Crosland during the period September 1, 1992, to the present, including, but not limited to, receipts, fee records, bank deposits
and monetary instruments.”202 Before the firm had adequate
opportunity to respond, however, a seven-count indictment was
returned against Crosland, charging him with various narcoticrelated offenses.203
After a judicial hearing on a motion to quash, but prior to
the issuance of the court’s ruling, the government served upon
the law firm a trial subpoena duces tecum, seeking the same
information contained in the grand jury request.204 Again, the
law firm moved to quash. 205 In granting the motion, the court
observed that, unlike a grand jury subpoena, a trial subpoena
must satisfy three criteria—relevancy, admissibility, and specificity—and that the subject subpoena lacked sufficient specificity.206
The specificity requirement announced in [United States v.
Nixon] is designed to ensure that the use of trial subpoenas is
limited to securing the presence at trial of particular documents or sharply defined categories of documents. . . . The
fact that the government does not know who paid Crosland’s
attorney’s fees, and is seeking to determine this information
by means of a subpoena, points persuasively to the conclusion
that this trial subpoena is an impermissible “fishing expedition,” not a proper request for production of specifically identified documents. . . . Because there is no way to determine

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1126.
See id.
See id. at 1128.
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whether the requested documents would in fact produce evidence related to the pending charges, the trial subpoena in
question must be quashed as insufficiently specific.207

Discussion of this case is apt not only for its demonstrative
value with respect to judicial involvement in subpoena disputes, but also for its interrelation with the United States Attorneys’ Manual. Section 9-13.410—Guidelines for Issuing
Grand Jury or Trial Subpoenas to Attorneys for Information
Relating to the Representation of Clients—mandates that an
attorney seeking such information via a trial subpoena first
obtain departmental consent.208 In light of the information
sought, the government prosecutor in Crosland undoubtedly
was required to comply with this provision prior to the subpoena’s issuance. In fact, the regulation expressly provides that
the Department greatly scrutinizes such requests, given “the
potential effects upon an attorney-client relationship that may
result from the issuance” of such trial subpoenas.209
To require the division of the court, upon independent
counsel request, to review the propriety of issuing a trial subpoena pursuant to section 9-13.410 is directly analogous to this
preexisting judicial function. As in Crosland, the division of the
court would review the subpoena, as well as the facts accompanying the request, before making a determination whether the
subpoena should issue.
The same rationale applies equally to other regulations in
the Manual pertinent to the issuance of subpoenas. Departmental approval is required, for example, before a subpoena
may issue to a member of the news media, or before toll records
may be obtained from such members.210 Similarly, the Department must consent to the issuance of “any subpoenas to persons or entities in the United States for records located
abroad,” and to the service of “a subpoena ad testificandum on
an officer of, or attorney for, a foreign bank or corporation who
is temporarily in or passing through the United States when
the testimony sought relates to the officer’s or attorney’s duties
in connection with the operation of the bank or corporation.”211

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1129.
See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-13.410.
Id.
See id. § 9-13.400.
Id. § 9-13.525.
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C. Post-trial Practices
Though the aforementioned sections represent only a sampling of the multitude of pretrial regulations that govern
United States Attorney conduct,212 there are, in addition, a host
of regulations that govern a prosecutor’s post-trial practices.
1. Plea procedures
Illustrative of such regulations are those pertaining to plea
agreements. The Manual mandates, for example, that the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division be notified when
entering into a plea arrangement in a death penalty case.213
Approval is also requisite for pleas of nolo contendere,214Alford
pleas,215 multi-district (global) pleas,216 and pleas with congressional members or federal judges.217 Moreover, as a general
practice, before entering into any type of plea agreement, the
prosecutor must consult with the investigating agency, as well
as any victims.218 Relatedly, approval must also be secured
prior to dismissing readily provable charges, as well as before
filing downward departure motions.219

212. The following listing denotes some of the additional pretrial regulations that
satisfy the constitutional mandates of Morrison: United States Attorneys’ Manual section 9-2.181 (requiring that approval be obtained in Organized Crime Strike Force
matters for various activities, including court authorized electronic surveillance, witness immunities, and plea agreements); section 9-5.150 (requiring approval prior to
seeking the closure of judicial proceedings); section 9-23.130 (requiring authorization
prior to requesting immunity); section 9-23.400 (requiring approval before initiating or
recommending that an immunized person be prosecuted for an offense emanating from
evidence obtained pursuant to an immunity grant); Criminal Resource Manual section
2084 (requiring prior approval to seek a restraining order in a RICO case); United
States Attorneys’ Manual section 9-112.110 (requiring Department authorization prior
to seeking “the judicial forfeiture of property that would not otherwise be forfeited administratively in cases that are not covered by the exception for compelling prosecutorial considerations or the exception for aggregation of seized property”); section 9112.220 (requiring prior approval for “denial by seizing agency of in forma pauperis
petition”); section 9-112.240 (requiring approval before a “pre-indictment ex parte application [may be submitted] for a Temporary Restraining Order in a criminal forfeiture case”).
213. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-10.100.
214. See id. § 9-16.010.
215. See id. § 9-16.015.
216. See id. § 9-27.641.
217. See id. § 9-16.110.
218. See id. § 9-16.030. Consultation is also required before agreeing to return
property otherwise subject to forfeiture. See id. § 9-113.103.
219. See id. § 9-16.030.
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The judicial role with respect to the acceptance of pleas is
well established. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that it is the duty of the court to accept or reject a proposed guilty plea as well as any dispositive
arrangements subsequently entered into between the government and the defendant. The pertinent aspects of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 provide:
(a) Alternatives
(1) In General. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or
nolo contendere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of
not guilty.
(2) Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and
the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . .
(b) Nolo Contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere
only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by the court only after due consideration of the views
of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective
administration of justice.
....
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
....
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been
reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require
the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing
of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered.220

Rule 11 also requires judicial approval prior to the dismissal of
criminal charges.221 The court must further inform the defen-

220. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (a)(1) and (2), (b), and (e)(2). See also North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that the trial court did not err when, in possible
death penalty case, the court accepted a plea of guilty where the state had strong evidence of his guilt and the defendant maintained his innocence); United States v.
Rivera, 25 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing that Rivera’s codefendants had earlier entered into a global plea agreement with the government).
221. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e)(1)(A).
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dant that, in imposing sentence, it must follow the Sentencing
Guidelines, if applicable, but that it may depart (upward or
downward) from that sentencing range.222
Given this judicial role, it can scarcely be claimed that division of the court authority, as defined in my proposal, to endorse such plea and sentencing arrangements constitutes either an impermissible burden on Executive Branch authority
or is inconsistent with the division of the court’s existing judicial functions. Rather, such a function is consonant with longstanding judicial practice.
2. Appellate procedures
Similarly, there are several regulations that address a
prosecutor’s appellate practices. Section 9-2.170 provides, in
pertinent part, that approval must be obtained for:
2. A petition for rehearing that suggests rehearing en banc—
and any rare appeal in which the government wishes to suggest that it be heard initially en banc. See Fed. R. App. P.
35(c). Although a petition for panel rehearing does not require
the approval of the Solicitor General, one should not be filed
until the Solicitor General has been given the opportunity to
decide whether the case merits en banc review.
3. A petition for mandamus or other extraordinary relief.
4. In a government appeal, a request that the case be assigned to a different district court judge on remand.
5. A request for recusal of a court of appeals judge.
6. A petition for certiorari [which may be filed only by the Solicitor General] . . . .223

Each of the delineated categories pertain to prosecutorial
appellate processes that directly correspond to routine United
States circuit court or Supreme Court practice. Federal appellate courts routinely decide whether petitions for rehearings or
en banc reviews are granted,224 whether mandamus relief is

222. See id. at 11(c)(1).
223. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 123, § 9-2.170.
224. See FED. R. APP. P. 40 (detailing procedures with respect to petitions for
panel rehearing); id. 35 (detailing procedures with respect to en banc determinations).
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warranted,225 whether a remand order will require the assignment of a different district court judge,226 and whether a circuit
court judge should be recused from consideration of a matter.227
Likewise, the Supreme Court customarily determines whether
to grant petitions for certiorari.228
To argue that the extension of such activities to the division
of the court somehow unconstitutionally encroaches upon the
Executive Branch function is simply an untenable notion.
Rather than abridge Article III principles, the requirement of
division of the court approval, if sought by the independent
counsel, is consistent with the constitutional explication in
Morrison. Each of the assigned duties satisfies the constitutional standard given their unmistakable relation to judicial
appellate court practice.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted, inter alia, to establish that the
exercise of independent counsel discretion can be effectively
governed through a process that mandates compliance with the
United States Attorneys’ Manual, satisfies the constitutional
standards delineated in Morrison, and avoids the real and apparent conflicts of interests associated with internal Executive
Branch investigations and prosecutions. By demonstrating the
inextricable link between the highlighted provisions of the
United States Attorneys’ Manual and the judicial function, it
has been demonstrated that the proposed measure is consistent
with the requirements of Article III.
However, there is a supplementary argument that must be
similarly presented and equally stressed. For this, too, constitutes yet another compelling Article III-based justification on
behalf of the proposal’s constitutionality. Among the delegated
powers considered in Morrison was the authority of the Special

225. See In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that independent
counsel was entitled to mandamus relief).
226. See United States v. Waskom, 179 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that defendant was entitled to the recusal of sentencing judge and to be resentenced before a
different district court judge).
227. See In re Apex Oil Co., 981 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that recusal was
not required of Eighth Circuit judge despite his former partnership in law firm that
had represented Alaska fishermen).
228. See SUP. CT. R. 14 (detailing procedures with respect to petitions for writs of
certiorari).
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Division, as defined in § 596(b)(2), to terminate the operations
of an independent counsel. As observed by the Supreme Court,
that section authorized the division of the court,
acting either on its own or on the suggestion of the Attorney
General, [to] terminate the office of an independent counsel at
any time if it finds that “the investigation of all matters
within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent
counsel . . . have been completed or so substantially completed
that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to
complete such investigations and prosecutions.”229

The Court was unmistakably more troubled with this provision than with the others it had considered. It noted that the
division’s termination authority, “especially when exercised by
the division on its own motion, [was] ‘administrative’ ” in nature, in that the division was mandated to monitor independent counsel activity and determine whether his job was “completed.”230 The Court further observed that, unlike other
provisions the Court had considered, § 596(b) was void of analogues with respect to judicial activity.231 Despite these dual
concerns, however, the Court upheld the section, finding that it
did not constitute a “significant judicial encroachment upon executive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion of the independent counsel.”232 Construing the provision narrowly, the
Court permitted the division of the court to terminate an independent counsel’s activities only after determining that the
counsel’s duties are
truly “completed” or “so substantially completed” that there
remains no need for any continuing action by the independent
counsel. It is basically a device for removing from the public
payroll an independent counsel who has served his or her
purpose, but is unwilling to acknowledge the fact. So construed, the Special Division’s power to terminate does not
pose a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that
are more properly within the Executive’s authority to require
that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III.233

229.
(1978)).
230.
231.
232.
233.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 664 (1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2)
Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 683.
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The concerns that occupied the Court with respect to §
596(b)(2)—the administrative nature of the function and the
want of analogous judicial duties—are simply not present with
respect to the instant proposal. First, unlike § 596(b)(2), my
proposal does not require, or even permit, any monitoring by
the division of the court of independent counsel activity. Second, the division is void of any authority to initiate any kind of
review of contemplated independent counsel action. Only if the
Department of Justice disapproves conduct proposed by an independent counsel does the independent counsel have the option to seek review before the division of the court. Division of
the court review is entirely dependent upon the initiation of the
process by the independent counsel. Moreover, as demonstrated above, when review is sought, it may only be sought
with respect to those provisions in the United States Attorneys’
Manual which are either directly analogous to functions performed by the judiciary or impose only a de minimis judicial
imposition upon Executive Branch activity. Thus, the two aspects attendant to § 596(b)(2) which proved troubling to the
Court are completely absent here.234
My proposal to control the exercise of independent counsel
discretion is, I submit, constitutionally sound and imposes few,
if any, meaningful efficiency costs. The benefits to the public at
large as well as the oft-ignored individual defendant are inestimable. The reality and the appearances of fairness will be
greatly enhanced, and with the mandated controls imposed
upon independent counsel behavior, independent counsel conduct will be more managed and subject to less legitimate criticism. Senator Howard Baker’s suggestion for a “cooling off” period was, in essence, a request to avoid the incautious decisionmaking that can too easily accompany an emotionally charged
debate. Hopefully, as the period of recuperation progresses,
Congress will recognize that not only is reauthorization necessary, but that the exercise of independent counsel discretion
can be effectively, and constitutionally, controlled.
234. See United States v. McDougal, 906 F. Supp. 494, 497 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (The
court upheld the constitutionality of the amendments in 1994 to § 596(b)(2). For a discussion of the amendment to § 596(b)(2), see supra note 87 and accompanying text. The
1994 amendment added certain review requirements upon the division of the court
that, in essence, required the court, again on its own motion, to periodically determine
whether termination of independent counsel activities was warranted. The court in
McDougal rejected the defendant’s claim that the imposition of this extra duty upon
the judiciary violated the dictates of Morrison.).

